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Abstract— We consider a setting in which several operators
offer downlink wireless data access services in a certain
geographical region. Each operator deploys several base
stations or access points, and registers some subscribers. In
such a situation, if operators pool their infrastructure, and
permit the possibility of subscribers being served by any of
the cooperating operators, then there can be overall better
user satisfaction, and increased operator revenue. We use
coalitional game theory to investigate such resource pooling
and cooperation between operators. We use utility functions
to model user satisfaction, and show that the resulting
coalitional game has the property that if all operators
cooperate (i.e., form a grand coalition) then there is an
operating point that maximizes the sum utility over the
operators while providing the operators revenues such that
no subset of operators has an incentive to break away
from the coalition. We investigate whether such operating
points can result in utility unfairness between users of the
various operators. We also study other revenue sharing
concepts, namely, the nucleolus and the Shapely value. Such
investigations throw light on criteria for operators to accept
or reject subscribers, based on the service level agreements
proposed by them. We also investigate the situation in
which only certain subsets of operators may be willing
to cooperate.
I. INTRODUCTION
The last decade has witnessed rapid proliferation of
commercial wireless services. End users subscribe to the
operators of their choice. Operators deploy service units
like access points, base stations etc. in their coverage
areas, and lease parts of the spectrum and allocate the
corresponding frequency bands to the service units that
they control. The service units in turn transmit and
receive data, voice etc. in the allocated bands to and from
the end users subscribing to the respective operators. An
end user may experience poor quality of service owing
to overload or poor channel conditions of the bands
licensed by the operator it has subscribed to, and may
not receive any service if it is outside the coverage area
of its operator. For instance, small towns and rural areas
in India are primarily covered by the national telecom-
munications operator, BSNL, whereas private operators
like Airtel, Hutch provide better coverage in cities. If,
however, different operators pool their resources, then
the end users of one operator can be served by service
units of another operator when they move outside the
coverage areas of their own operator and also in the event
of overload or sustained poor transmission quality. Such
cooperation is likely to substantially enhance the aggre-
gate user satisfaction, and thereby revenue, which can
in turn be appropriately shared among the participating
operators. Indeed such cooperation may be viewed as a
primitive form of spectrum pooling [1] that requires no
changes in the equipment; only the high level network
control policies are changed.
The success of such cooperation is however contingent
upon developing a rational basis for sharing the ag-
gregate revenue among the cooperating entities. This
is because an operator will cooperate with others not
merely to improve the aggregate revenue, but only when
such cooperation increases its share of revenue, and it
perceives that its share of revenue is commensurate with
its role in attaining the aggregate reward. Such a basis
will allow an operator to optimize its revenue share by
appropriately determining who it should cooperate with
and how it should cooperate. Specifically, an operator’s
revenue should depend on the revenue fetched by the end
users that subscribe to it and the revenue it generates for
its and others’ end users. Both of the above depend on
(a) the locations of the end users, (b) the channel gains
of the frequency bands, (c) service demands of the end
users, (d) the ownership of the end users, (e) allocations
of the end users to the service units, (f) locations of
the service units, and (g) which operators are willing
to cooperate and (h) whether and how each operator
distinguishes among the end users that belong to it and
those that belong to other operators. Note that operators
control (e), (f), (g), (h), and also (c) and (d) in part (by
choosing not to accept end users with certain service
demands), but does not control (a) and (b).
The contribution of this paper is to develop a framework
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that determines how the operators share the aggregate
revenue commensurate with their resources and actions.
We model cooperation among operators using the theory
of coalitional games [2] (Section II). We consider a coali-
tional game among the operators, and obtain the above
revenues as the solution of a concave optimization which
depends on utilities or satisfaction functions of end users
and resource utilization in presence of cooperation in the
wireless context (specifically on factors (a) to (h) above).
Our coalitional game model reveals that cooperation
among operators can induce unfairness among end users.
Specifically, depending on the utility functions of the
end users, cooperation among carriers may decrease the
quality of service experienced by some end users, al-
though such cooperation enhances the aggregate quality
of service. This may in turn reduce the customer base
of the respective operator and thereby affect its share of
the aggregate revenue. Thus, an operator must carefully
assess the impact of cooperation on its customers, and
judiciously determine the utility functions and/or ensure
certain minimum quality of service to its end users
during cooperation, even if this decreases the aggregate
revenue.
We next prove that when all operators cooperate (i.e.,
forms a grand coalition), there exists a revenue allo-
cation for the operators that ensures that if a subset
of operators separate from the grand coalition then,
irrespective of the manner in which the subset shares
the aggregate revenue it generates after separating, at
least one operator in the subset is worse off than in
the grand coalition (Section III-A). Such a revenue
allocation renders the grand coalition stable as no subset
of operators now has an incentive to separate; this is
socially desirable as the aggregate revenue is maximized
when all operators cooperate. We also show that one such
allocation can be computed from a solution of a convex
optimization whose number of variables and constraints
are polynomial in the number of operators, service units
and end users. In coalitional game terminology, the set
of all such allocations is said to be the core [2]. Thus,
we have shown that the core is non-empty and have
obtained an allocation in the core in polynomial time.
This is interesting from a game theoretic point of view
as there are several games that satisfy neither of these
properties.
We next investigate other solution concepts that provide
a basis for sharing the revenue, namely the nucleolus and
the Shapley value [2] (Section III-B). The motivation for
this investigation is that both the above exist uniquely for
any coalitional game while the core consists of several
allocations in general and also for the game we consider.
We show that the nucleolus renders the grand coalition
stable, but the Shapley value does not attain this goal.
The Shapley value therefore does not provide a desirable
basis for sharing revenues in this case.
An interesting direction for future research is to investi-
gate how each operator can optimize its actions so as
to maximize its share of the revenue as provided by
the above sharing mechanisms (e.g., nucleolus or other
allocations in the core). As a first step towards that end,
we investigate which end users an operator should accept
(Section III-C). The question is important, as an end
user will typically require a minimum quality of service
guarantee (a service level agreement or a SLA) which
an operator needs to honor if it accepts the end user,
and such SLAs may reduce the aggregate revenue of
the coalitions. But, an operator ought to accept an end
user if its subscription enhances the revenue the operator
earns, irrespective of how such an acceptance affects
the aggregate revenue. We demonstrate that, although
SLAs reduce the aggregate revenues of the coalitions,
the ownership of the end users demanding the SLAs
may increase the revenue the respective operators earn,
in which case, the operators ought to accept the SLAs.
Next, an end user may require a SLA, an operator can
honor only when it cooperates with other operators. If
the operator accepts such a SLA, it incurs a huge penalty
when it is not cooperating with any other operator as
then it cannot honor the SLA. Nevertheless, we show
that there are instances where depending on (a) the
service, the operator can offer to end users owned by
other operators, and (b) the service, this specific end user
can obtain from other operators, the presence of such
an end user may actually enhance the operator’s share
of revenue. The operator should accordingly accept or
reject such an end user.
Finally, all operators may not be willing to cooperate
owing to factors other than revenue, e.g, lack of mutual
trust etc. We model the trust relations using a graph,
and using a graphical coalitional game, generalize our
framework to accommodate such extraneous considera-
tions (Section IV). We show that the grand coalition can
be stabilized in this case as well. Thus, all operators that
are allowed to cooperate can be induced to cooperate,
which again is a socially desirable outcome.
We now comment on the related work in context of
wireless networks. Game theoretic investigation of re-
source allocation in wireless networks, and spectrum
allocation in particular, has so far largely relied on tools
from non-cooperative game theory (e.g., [3], [4], [5],
[6], [7]). Principles from cooperative game theory are
likely to substantially enhance our understanding of this
area, particularly since many of the resource allocation
mechanisms rely on cooperation among nodes. Towards
this end, Nash bargaining solutions have been proposed
for power control and spectrum sharing among multiple
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users [8]. Coalitional games have recently been used for
modeling cooperation among nodes in the physical layer
[9], [10]. We propose a coalitional game model for a
simple form of spectrum pooling in wireless data access
networks. We model spectrum and service unit pooling
among different operators. Thus, the specific coalitional
games we consider, and the analytical results we obtain,
significantly differ from those of the above papers.
II. A COALITIONAL GAME FORMULATION
Definition 2.1: A coalitional game with transferable
payoff consists of a set of players N = 1, . . . , n and
a characteristic function v(.) which is a real valued
function on the power set of N . For a subset S of
N , v(S), the characteristic value of S, provides the
aggregate wealth generated by the players in S, when
only these players form a coalition, irrespective of the
actions of the players in N \ S.
In this work we confine ourselves to coalitional games
with transferable payoff, and hence omit the phrase
transferable payoff in further discussion, without causing
any ambiguity.
A coalitional game is fully defined once N and v(.)
are specified. In this section, we formulate a coalitional
game on the set of operators.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of operators. Each
operator i owns service units in the set Bi and end users
(or simply users) in the set Mi. We assume that a service
unit and a user can be associated with only one operator,
i.e., Bi∩Bj = φ and Mi∩Mj = φ for i 6= j. Let B and
M be the sets of service units and users in the system
respectively, and |B| = B, |M| = M . Let user k needs
a minimum rate mk, which constitutes the service level
agreement between k and k’s operator.
Each operator licenses certain frequency bands, which
are allocated to the service units it owns. We assume that
no two service units in a vicinity are assigned the same
band, and a frequency band is licensed by at most one
operator. Thus, the communications of different service
units do not interfere. When service unit j serves user
k, k receives a rate Rjk , which depends on the locations
of j, k, channel gain of the frequency band used by j,
transmission power and the reception gain of the two
units. A service unit serves at most one user at a given
time.
Definition 2.2: A coalition S ⊆ N is a subset of
operators who cooperate. For a coalition S, BS , MS
are the sets of service units and users associated with
operators in S. The coalition N is termed as the grand
coalition.
Let αjk be the fraction of time, the service unit j serves
the user k; {αjk, j ∈ BS , k ∈ MS} are determined by
the service allocation rules of the operators. A service
unit j may serve a user k, i.e., αjk > 0, only when
either both are associated with the same operator, or
the operators associated with them are in a coalition.
When user k’s operator is part of the coalition S, the
rate obtained by k is yk =
∑
j∈BS
αjkRjk. When users
associated with operator i receive rates yi = {yk, k ∈
Mi}, then they generate a revenue of Ui(yi), where
Ui(.) is a concave increasing function. The function
Ui(.) is the utility function of the operator i, which
reflects the aggregate satisfaction of the users associated
with i. For example, utility functions can be linear, i.e.,
Ui(y
i) =
∑
k∈Mi
yk, or logarithmic, i.e., Ui(yi) =
∑
k∈Mi
log(yk).
Each operator can have constraints on the fraction of
time its service units serve the users of other operators,
which can be easily represented in the form Aα ≤ b.
But such constraints may be superfluous in presence of
the minimum rate constraints for the users. Thus we do
not consider such constraints; nevertheless all our results
hold in presence of such constraints.
Let S ⊆ N . Then, v(S) is the maximum revenue
generated by the operators in S, when only the operators
in S form a coalition. Note that the rates obtained, and
hence the revenues generated by the users in MS , do
not depend on the actions of the operators in N \S. Let
v(φ) = 0.
P(S:- Maximize:
∑
i∈S Ui(y
i)
Subject to:
1)
∑
k∈MS
αjk ≤ 1, j ∈ BS ,
2)
∑
j∈BS
αjk ≤ 1, k ∈ MS ,
3) yk ≤
∑
j∈BS
αjkRjk, k ∈ MS ,
4) yk ≥ mk, k ∈ MS
5) αjk ≥ 0, j ∈ BS , k ∈ MS ,
6) yk ≥ 0, k ∈ MS
If P(S) is feasible, v(S) equals the maximum value of
the objective function of P(S), else v(S) = −∞. Note
that P(S) may be infeasible only when mk > 0 for some
k ∈ MS .
A coalitional game is superadditive if v(S) ≥
∑
i∈I v(Si) where {Si, i ∈ I} constitute a partition of
S. Here, if P(S) is infeasible, and |S| > 1, then P(T )
is infeasible for some T ⊂ S. Next, if P(S) is feasible,
v(S) ≥
∑
i∈I v(Si) for any partition {Si, i ∈ I} of S.
Hence, the game we are considering, is superadditive.
We assume that v(N ) is feasible, i.e., the grand coalition
can satisfy all the minimum rate guarantees. Thus,
v(N ) ≥
∑
i∈I
v(Si), for any partition {Si, i ∈ I} of N
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Thus, the aggregate revenue is maximized if all the users
cooperate. Since the aggregate revenue is a measure of
the user satisfaction, the aggregate user satisfaction is
maximized when all the users cooperate.
We now elucidate v(.) using a simple example.
Example 2.1: Let n = 2, and each operator owns one
service unit and two users. Let Rjk = P if k ∈ M1,
and Rjk = G if k ∈ M2, for all j ∈ B. Let P < G.
Also, mk = 0 ∀ k ∈ M. Thus, P(S) is feasible for
all S ⊆ N . First, let the utility functions be linear.
Then, v({1}) = P , v({2}) = G, v({1, 2}) = 2G. Thus,
v({1, 2}) > v({1}) + v({2}). The optimum solution of
P({1, 2}) which attains v({1, 2}), assigns αjk = 0 ∀ j ∈
B, k ∈ M1. Thus, the users of operator 1 receive no
service when the two operators cooperate. But, when
operator 1 does not cooperate with operator 2, an opti-
mum solution of P({1}) assigns rates αP and (1−α)P
to its users, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, i.e., both the users
can potentially get non-zero rates. Thus, the coalition
enhances aggregate revenue but induces unfairness for
the users and may therefore reduce the customer base
of individual operators. We later demonstrate that this
may have serious repercussions on the revenues earned
by individual operators (Section III-C).
Finally, note that the above unfairness can be mitigated
by imposing appropriate minimum rate constraints for
users, or by choosing different utility functions, both of
which may in turn reduce the aggregate revenue. For
example, when the minimum required rate mk = P/2
for all the users k, then P(S) is still feasible for all
S ⊆ N , v({1}) = P , v({2}) = G, v({1, 2}) =
v({1}) + v({2}) = G + P < 2G. Similarly, when
Ui(y
i) =
∑
k∈Mi
log(yk), v({1}) = 2 log(P/2),
v({2}) = 2 log(G/2), v({1, 2}) = v({1}) + v({2}).
But, the optimum solutions of P({1, 2}) and P({1})
(resp. P({2})) allocates rates P/2 (resp. G/2) to each
of the users of operator 1 (resp. 2). Thus, in both of
the above cases, the coalition does not enhance the
aggregate revenue, reduces the revenue as compared to
that with linear utility and no minimum rate constraints,
but sustains the fair rate allocation among the users.
A coalitional game is convex if v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪
T ) + v(S ∩ T ) for all S, T ⊆ N . The game we are
considering, is not convex, as the following example
shows.
Example 2.2: Let n = 3, Bi = {i}, i = 1, 2, 3,M1 =
φ,Mi = {i − 1}, i = 2, 3. Let R1k = G, k ∈ M and
Rjk = P, j ∈ {2, 3}, k ∈ M. Let G > P . Let mk =
0, k ∈ M. Let the utility functions be linear. Thus,
v({1}) = 0, v({1, 2}) = v({1, 3}) = G, v({1, 2, 3}) =
G+P . Let S = {1, 2}, T = {1, 3}. Then, v(S)+v(T ) =
2G, v(S∪T )+v(S∩T ) = G+P . Thus, v(S)+v(T ) >
v(S ∪T )+ v(S ∩T ). Hence, this game is not convex.
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR SHARING THE REVENUE
GENERATED BY THE COALITIONS
Definition 3.1: A revenue allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn)
for the operators is said to be an imputation if
∑n
i=1 xi =
v(N ). The core, C, is the set of imputations for which
v(S) ≤
∑
i∈S xi for each S ⊂ N . Thus,
C = {x ∈ Rn : ∑
i∈N
xi = v(N ),
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S), ∀ S ⊂ N} (1)
In Example 2.1, C = {x ∈ R2 : x1 + x2 = 2G, x1 ≥
P, x2 ≥ G}.
Suppose C is non-empty. Let the operators form the
grand coalition and share the aggregate revenue v(N ) as
per an imputation x ∈ C. Next, let a subgroup S ⊂ N of
operators separates from the grand coalition and shares
the aggregate revenue v(S) as per z. Now, if zi ≤ xi
for an operator i ∈ S, it will not have any incentive
separating from the grand coalition. Thus, let zi > xi
for all i ∈ S. Clearly,
∑
i∈S zi = v(S) >
∑
i∈S xi. This
leads to a contradiction, since x ∈ C (see 1). Thus, no
subgroup will separate from the grand coalition. Thus,
the grand coalition is stable, which is a socially desirable
outcome, as the grand coalition maximizes the aggregate
user satisfaction. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 3.2: An imputation stabilizes the grand coali-
tion if it is in the core. The grand coalition is stabilizable
if the core is non-empty.
The grand coalitions in several coalitional games cannot
be stabilized (Example 260.3, p. 260, [2]), and it is
in general NP-hard to determine whether the grand
coalition in a given coalitional game can be stabilized
[11]. Convexity of the game is a sufficient condition for
the stabilizability of the grand coalition (p. 260, [2]), but
we know that this sufficiency condition does not hold in
our case (see Example 2.2).
Nevertheless, we next prove that, for the class of games
we are considering, C is always non-empty, and subse-
quently we obtain an imputation x ∈ C.
A. Is the grand coalition stabilizable?
Using the specific structure of our game, and proof
techniques presented in [12], [13], [14], [15], we prove
that C is non-empty and hence the grand coalition can
be stabilized (Section III-A). The proof is constructive
in that it provides an imputation in C as well.
Authorized licensed use limited to: University of Pennsylvania. Downloaded on May 28, 2009 at 11:33 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
Let λ ∈ R|BS |, β, γ, τ ∈ R|MS |. Define
fi(γ, τ ) = max
yk≥0,k∈Mi
(
Ui(y
i) −
∑
k∈Mi
(γk − τk)yk
)
D(S) :- Minimize:
∑
i∈S
(
fi(γ, τ ) +
∑
j∈Bi
λj +
∑
k∈Mi
(βk − τkmk)
)
Subject to:
1) λj + βk ≥ γkRjk, j ∈ BS , k ∈ MS ,
2) λj ≥ 0, j ∈ BS
3) βk ≥ 0, k ∈ MS
4) γk ≥ 0, k ∈ MS
5) τk ≥ 0, k ∈ MS
Note that D(S) is the dual of P(S) for each S ⊆ N .
Formulate D(N ) by appropriately defining vectors
λ, β, γ and τ . Let D constitute the set of optimal solu-
tions of D(N ). Clearly, D(S) is feasible for each S ⊆ N .
Thus, D 6= φ. Let
O = {x∗ ∈ Rn : x∗i = fi(γ∗, τ ∗) + ∑
j∈Bi
λ∗j +
∑
k∈Mi
(β∗k − τ
∗
kmk) for some (λ
∗, β∗, γ∗, τ ∗) ∈ D}
Theorem 3.1: O 6= φ and O ⊆ C.
Discussion: Note that, once we know that C 6= φ, an
imputation in C can be obtained using (1). But, the
computation time will be substantial for large n, as (1)
characterizes C using 2n inequalities. However, note that
fi(γ, τ ) is a convex function, as it is the pointwise
maximum value of a family of affine functions of (γ, τ )
[16]. Thus, clearly D(N ) is a convex optimization with
linear constraints. It consist of O(B + M) variables
and O(BM) constraints. The objective function is the
sum of n terms, and the time required to evaluate the
ith term is O(|Bi| + |Mi|), for any given value of the
variables. Thus, the time required to obtain one member
in D, and hence one member of O, is polynomial in
B, M, n [17]. Hence, the above theorem implies that, the
time required to obtain one imputation that stabilizes the
grand coalition, is polynomial in B, M, n.
Proof: Since D 6= φ, O 6= φ. We show that for an
arbitrary x∗ ∈ O, x∗ ∈ C.
Consider an arbitrary x∗ ∈ O, corresponding to some
(λ∗, β∗, γ∗, τ ∗) ∈ D. Now,
∑
i∈N x
∗
i is the optimal
value of the objective function of D(N ). Since D(S) is
the dual of P(S) for each S ⊆ N , by strong duality [16],
and since P(N ) is feasible,
∑
i∈N x
∗
i = v(N ). Now,
we only need to show that
∑
i∈S x
∗
i ≥ v(S) for each
S ⊂ N . If P(S) is infeasible, the result is immediate
as v(S) = −∞. Let P(S) be feasible. Then, by strong
duality, v(S) equals the optimum value of the objective
function of D(S). The sub-vectors λ∗s, β
∗
s , γ
∗
s , τ
∗
s con-
sisting of components of λ∗, β∗, γ∗, τ ∗ in S, constitute
a feasible solution of D(S), and
∑
i∈S x
∗
i is the value
of the objective function of D(S) for the above feasible
solution. The optimum value of the objective function
of D(S) is a lower bound for
∑
i∈S x
∗
i . Thus, we have
shown that x∗ ∈ C. The result follows.
Finally, we comment on the relation between Theo-
rem 3.1 and some related literature in game theory.
Samet et. al. [15] showed that when v(.) are the optimal
values of the objective functions of linear programs, then
the dual set of the linear program that generates v(N ),
is a subset of the core. Markakis et. al. [14] showed
that this result holds, when v(.) can be formulated as
concave objective functions of a multicommodity flow
problem. In our case, v(.) are the optimal values of
the objective functions of concave optimizations. Note
that the structure of the optimization we consider, is
distinct from that of the multicommodity flow problem.
Nevertheless, the proof of Theorem 3.1 uses the same
techniques as those in the corresponding result in [14].
B. Do other solution concepts stabilize the grand coali-
tion?
We next investigate the stability of two other well known
solution concepts for sharing revenues in coalitional
games: (i) nucleolus, (ii) Shapley value, and examine
whether these belong to C. The answer to this question
determines whether these attain a socially desirable
outcome by stabilizing the grand coalition.
We assume that P(S) is feasible, and hence v(S) is finite,
for all S ⊆ N .
We first consider the nucleolus.
Definition 3.3: The excess of a coalition S under an
imputation x is eS(x) = v(S) −
∑
i∈S xi; this is a
measure of dissatisfaction of S under x. Let E(x) =
(eS(x))S∈2N . The nucleolus is the set of imputations x
for which the vector E(x) is lexicographically minimal.
In Example 2.1, the nucleolus is ((G + P )/2, (3G −
P )/2).
The nucleolus of any coalitional game is a singleton (p.
288, [2]). Whenever the core of a coalitional game is
non-empty, the nucleolus belongs to the core. This is
because, for any imputation x in the core, E(x) ≤ 0, i.e.,
the maximum excess is negative. Hence for any imputa-
tion x∗, which leads to lexicographically minimal excess
vector among all the imputations, the corresponding
maximum excess will be negative. Hence, E(x∗) ≤ 0.
Thus, from (1), x∗ belongs to the core.
Thus, owing to Theorem 3.1, the nucleolus belongs to
C, and hence renders the grand coalition stable.
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We next consider the Shapley value.
Definition 3.4: For any i, and S ⊂ N such that i 6∈ S,
let ∆i(S) = v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S). The Shapley value is
the imputation x for which
xi =
1
n!
∑
U∈U
∆i(Si(U)), (2)
where U is the set of all orderings of the set of players,
and Si(U) is the set of players preceding i in ordering
U .
In Example 2.1, ∆i(φ) = v({i}), ∆1(2) = G, ∆2(1) =
2G − P , and the Shapley value is ((G + P )/2, (3G −
P )/2).
The significance of the Shapley value is that it is the
unique imputation that attains the following properties
(p. 292, [2]). (a) If i and j are interchangeable, i.e.,
∆i(S) = ∆j(S) for each S such that i, j 6∈ S, then
the imputation allocates equal revenues to both i and j
(symmetry). (b) If ∆i(S) = v({i}) for each S such that
i 6∈ S, then the imputation allocates revenue v({i}) to i
(dummy player allocation). (c) Consider two coalitional
games with the set of players N , and the characteristic
functions w1(.), w2(.), and a third coalitional game with
the same set of players, and the characteristic function
w1(.) + w2(.). Then, the imputation that constitutes the
Shapley value for the third coalitional game equals the
sum of those for the first two (additivity).
We next demonstrate that the Shapley value need not be
in C.
Lemma 3.1: For n = 2, the Shapley value is in C. For
n > 2, the Shapley value need not be in C.
Proof: First, let n = 2. Let (x1, x2) be the Shapley
value. We need to show that xi ≥ v({i}) for i = 1, 2.
Now, since v(S) is finite for any S ⊆ N , and the game
is superadditive, ∆i(S) ≥ v({i}), for any i and S ⊂ N
such that i 6∈ S. The result follows from (2).
Now, let n = 3. Consider a system with (i) Bi = {i}
Mi = {i}, for each operator i, (ii) Ui(yi) = yi, and
(iii) mk = 0 for each k ∈ M. Let R12 = R21 = R23 =
R32 = 1 and Rjk = 0 otherwise. Refer to Figure 1.
Clearly, v({i}) = 0 ∀ i, v({1, 2}) = v({2, 3}) =
v({1, 2, 3}) = 2, v({1, 3}) = 0. Table I shows all
possible orderings U of the operators, and ∆i(U) for
each operator i and ordering U . From (2) and Table I,
the Shapley value of the operators is x = (2
6
, 8
6
, 2
6
). Note
that x1 + x2 = 106 < v({1, 2}). Hence x 6∈ C.
Thus, the Shapley value does not in general render the
grand coalition stable for the class of games we consider,
and hence is not a desirable basis for allocating the
revenues in these games.
 1                     2  3 Service Units     
Users  1                       2                     3
Fig. 1. Links between the service units and the users that provide
non-zero rates. Each of the shown links has rate 1.
TABLE I
ALL POSSIBLE ORDERINGS AND MARGINAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF
THE PLAYERS.
U ∆1(U) ∆2(U) ∆3(U)
123 0 2 0
132 0 2 0
213 2 0 0
231 0 0 2
312 0 2 0
321 0 2 0
Finally, note that the proof for Lemma 3.1 shows that
the Shapley value is not in the core even when (i) each
operator owns one service unit and one user each, (ii)
the utility functions are linear, and (iii) the users do not
require any minimum rate guarantees. In this special
case, the coalitional game we consider, becomes the
same as the well known permutation game [18], [19].
Thus, our proof reveals that the Shapley value does not
belong to the core for permutation games.
C. Optimal selection of SLAs using different solution
concepts
Example 2.1 has demonstrated that a coalition can in-
duce unfairness for the users, and can deteriorate the
throughput attained by some of them. The users therefore
negotiate SLAs (here, the minimum rate guarantees)
with the operators apriori. We now demonstrate, how
the operators can use the above solution concepts to
determine which SLAs they ought to accept. The SLAs
impose the minimum rate constraints in P(S) for the
coalitions S, and hence may reduce the aggregate rev-
enues v(.) generated by the coalitions. But, the main
consideration for an operator is whether the SLAs reduce
the revenue it earns. Also, an operator may be able
to honor some SLAs even when it does not cooperate
with other operators, and some other SLAs only when it
cooperates with others. The question therefore is whether
an operator ought to accept all SLAs that it can honor by
itself, or should also accept some SLAs it can honor only
in coalitions. Using simple variations in Example 2.1, we
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show that the answers to the above questions can often
be counter-intuitive.
In Example 2.1, recall that C = {x ∈ R2 : x1 + x2 =
2G, x1 ≥ P, x2 ≥ G}. Thus, minx∈C x1 = P , and
hence operator 1 earns a revenue of at least P , as
long as the imputation is in C. Also, the nucleolus is
((G+P )/2, (3G−P )/2). When the operators cooperate,
the users of operator 1 do not receive any service,
i.e., have 0 rates, and therefore generate 0 revenue.
Now, suppose they demand minimum rate guarantees
of z > 0 each, and suppose operator 1 does not agree
to these demands, and these users subsequently leave.
Then, M1 = φ, and v({1}) = 0. But, the function
v(.) does not change otherwise. Thus, C = {x ∈ R2 :
x1 + x2 = 2G, x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ G}, minx∈C x1 = 0, and
the nucleolus is (G/2, 3G/2). Thus, operator 1 may not
earn any revenue even when the imputation is in the core,
and the nucleolus also gives it less revenue than in the
previous case. Thus, although the users of an operator
do not generate any revenue, their mere presence may
enhance the revenues earned by the operator. Thus, the
operators need to judiciously determine, which SLAs to
accept.
Now, assume that operator 1 agrees to provide minimum
rates m1 and m2 to its users, where m1+m2 ≤ P . Thus,
P(S) is feasible for each S ⊆ N . Now, v({1, 2}) =
m1+m2+(2−
m1+m2
P
)G and v(.) function is unchanged
otherwise. Thus, C = {x ∈ R2 : x1 + x2 = m1 + m2 +
(2− m1+m2
P
)G, x1 ≥ P, x2 ≥ G}, minx∈C x1 = P , and
the nucleolus is (P+m1+m2
2
+ (1 − m1+m2
P
)G/2, (3 −
m1+m2
P
)G/2− P−m1−m2
2
). Thus, the minimum revenue
earned by operator 1 exceeds that when operator 1 does
not accept the SLAs (and subsequently lose both of its
users), when the imputation is in the core, . Thus, if
operator 1 always earns this minimum revenue, it should
accept the SLAs. When the imputation is the nucleolus,
even then, the revenue earned by operator 1 exceeds that
when the SLAs are not accepted, provided m1 + m2 <
P 2/(G − P ). Thus, if operator 1 either needs to accept
both the SLAs or reject both the SLAs, it should select
the first option, provided m1 + m2 < P 2/(G− P ), and
should select the second otherwise.
Next, suppose that operator 1 accepts the SLA of user
k, and rejects that of the other user. Clearly, mk ≤
m1 + m2 ≤ P . Still, P(S) is feasible for each S ⊆ N .
Now, v({1, 2}) = mk +(2−
mk
P
)G, and v(.) function is
unchanged otherwise. Thus, C = {x ∈ R2 : x1 + x2 =
mk+(2−
mk
P
)G, x1 ≥ P, x2 ≥ G}, minx∈C x1 = P , and
the nucleolus is (P+mk
2
+(1− mk
P
)G/2, (3− mk
P
)G/2−
P−mk
2
). Thus, if operator 1 always earns the minimum
revenue, subject to the imputation being in the core, it
should accept at least one SLA - its revenue remains
same irrespective of whether it accepts one or both the
SLAs. On the other hand, if the revenues are allocated as
per the nucleolus, then operator 1 earns greater revenue,
if it accepts one SLA rather than accepting both SLAs.
If it accepts one SLA, it should accept the less stringent
SLA (i.e., the SLA which prescribes a lower value of the
minimum rate). Furthermore, it should accept at least one
SLA if and only if min(m1, m2) < P 2/(G − P ), and
should reject both SLAs if min(m1, m2) ≥ P 2/(G −
P ). Summarily, if the revenue allocation is as per the
nucleolus, operator 1 should accept the less stringent
SLA, provided min(m1, m2) < P 2/(G− P ), and reject
both otherwise. When P < G/3, P 2/(G − P ) < P/2,
then there exist m1, m2 such that P 2/(G − P ) <
min(m1, m2) < P/2 and m1 + m2 < P . For any such
(m1, m2), operator 1 rejects both the SLAs, although it
can satisfy both together even when it does not form
a coalition with operator 2. Thus, an operator may
reject all the SLAs even when it can satisfy all of them
simultaneously by itself.
Next, we consider the situation in which the minimum
rate requirements are such that operator 1 cannot satisfy
them by itself, but can satisfy if forms a coalition with
operator 2. Thus v({1}) = −∞. Since users of operator
2 do not have any minimum rate requests, P({2}) is
feasible, and P({1, 2}) is also feasible by assumption.
Thus, C = {x ∈ R2 : x1 + x2 = v({1, 2}), x2 ≥ G}.
Thus, infx∈C x1 = −∞, and operator 2 can compel
operator 1 to pay it any amount it deems fit, even when
the revenue allocation is in the core. Thus, in this case
operator 1 should not agree to such SLAs. Note that the
nucleolus is ill-defined in this case.
We now consider a different game, to examine whether
an operator should always refuse SLAs that it can not
satisfy by itself. Let n = 3, Bi = {i},Mi = {i}, i =
1, 2, 3. Let R1k = G, k = 2, 3, Rj1 = G, j = 2, 3,
where G > 0, and Rjk = 0, otherwise. Also, let
m1 > 0, mk = 0 for k > 1. Assume linear utility
functions, i.e., Ui(yi) = yi for each i. Since R11 = 0,
operator 1 cannot provide rate m1 to user 1 unless it
forms a coalition with another operator. Thus, v({1}) =
−∞, v({i}) = 0, i > 1, v({1, 2} = v({1, 3}) =
v({1, 2, 3}) = 2G, v({2, 3}) = 0. Thus, C = {x ∈R3 : x1 + x2 + x3 = 2G, x1 + x2 ≥ 2G, x1 + x3 ≥
2G, x2 ≥ 0, x3 ≥ 0}. If x ∈ C, x1+x2 = 2G−x3. Thus,
2G ≤ 2G−x3, which implies that x3 ≤ 0. Since x3 ≥ 0,
x3 = 0. Similarly, it can be shown that x2 = 0. Hence,
x1 = 2G − x2 − x3 = 2G. Thus, C = {(2G, 0, 0)}.
Now, if operator 1 refuses the SLA of user 1, M1 = φ,
v({i}) = 0, ∀ i, v({1, 2} = v({1, 3}) = v({1, 2, 3}) =
G, v({2, 3}) = 0. Thus, C = {x ∈ R3 : x1 + x2 + x3 =
G, x1 +x2 ≥ G, x1 +x3 ≥ G, xi ≥ 0, ∀ i}. Arguing as
before, C = {(G, 0, 0)}. Thus, the revenue of operator 1
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decreases when it refuses the SLA of its user. Hence, an
operator’s revenue may increase when it accepts a SLA
it can not satisfy by itself, and so it may register an user
whose SLA, it can not satisfy by itself.
D. Selecting an imputation in the core
We now examine how the revenue allocations can be
selected amongst the imputations in C. The question is
relevant as C usually consists of multiple imputations,
e.g., as in Example 2.1. One possibility is to select
an imputation in C that maximizes a concave objective
function. Once the objective is determined, the optimal
imputation can be obtained using the characterization
of C in (1). But, since (1) characterizes C using 2n
inequalities, the computation time for such an imputation
will be exponential in n. We now examine whether C
can be characterized using polynomial number of convex
inequalities, which will in turn ensure that the compu-
tation time for such imputations will be polynomial in
n, B, M . Note that this is unlikely in several well-known
coalitional games, as a simpler question of determining
whether a given imputation is in the core turns out to be
NP-hard in these games [20]. In our context, we answer
this question only in part.
We show that C can be characterized using polynomial
number of inequalities in the special case that (i) each
operator owns at most one service unit and at most one
user, (ii) the utility functions are linear, and (iii) the users
do not require minimum rate guarantees. This case can
be reduced to the case that each operator owns exactly
one service unit and one user, by introducing dummy
service units j (users k) as required, with Rjk = 0 for
all such j (k). Note that the modified game has the same
set of players and characteristic function as the original
game, and therefore has the same core. The modified
game has the same form as permutation game, and C =
O in this game [19]. Note that in this special case O
can be characterized as follows.
O = {x ∈ Rn : xi = ∑
j∈Bi
λj +
∑
k∈Mi
βk,
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N ),
λj + βk ≥ Rjk, λj ≥ 0, βk ≥ 0, ∀ j ∈ B, k ∈ M}
Thus, C can be characterized using O(n + B + M)
variables and O(BM) constraints.
Using a counter example, we next show that O is in
general a proper subset of C when (i) does not hold
even if (ii) and (iii) hold. This is an important distinction
between the game we consider and the permutation
game. The example also shows that (a) an imputation
x that is maxmin fair in C, and maximizes
∑
i∈N logxi
in C, and (b) the nucleolus, need not belong to O. Thus,
O may not consider several important imputations in C.
Lemma 3.2: There exists a system where (i) n = 2, (ii)
|Bi| = 1 for each operator i, |Mi| > 1 for some i,
(iii) the utility functions are linear, and (iv) the users
do not require minimum rate guarantees, and O ⊂
C. Furthermore, in this system, the nucleolus and the
imputations x that are maxmin fair in C and maximize
∑
i∈N logxi in C, do not belong to O.
Proof: Consider a system with (i) n = 2, (ii) |Bi| =
1 for each operator i, |M1| = m, M2 = φ (iii) Ui(yi) =
∑
k∈Mi
yk, and (iv) mk = 0 for each k ∈ M. Since
operator 2 does not have any user, we do not specify
its utility function. Let R1k = P, R2k = G for each
k ∈ M, where G > P > 0. Thus (G + P )/2 > P > 0.
Clearly, v({1}) = P, v({2}) = 0, v({1, 2}) = G + P .
Consider the imputation x = ((G + P )/2, (G + P )/2).
From (1), and since (G + P )/2 > P > 0, x ∈ C. Also,
x is maxmin fair in C, and maximizes log(z1)+ log(z2)
among all z ∈ C. We show that x 6∈ O when m is
sufficiently large.
In this case, D({1, 2}) is the following linear program.
min λ1 + λ2 +
m
∑
k=1
βk
s.t. λ1 + βk ≥ P, 1 ≤ k ≤ m (3)
λ2 + βk ≥ G, 1 ≤ k ≤ m (4)
λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0, βk ≥ 0, 1 ≤ k ≤ m (5)
Suppose x ∈ O. Then,
λ∗1 +
m
∑
k=1
β∗k =
G + P
2
(6)
λ∗2 =
G + P
2
(7)
for some optimal solution (λ∗, β∗) of D({1, 2}). Thus,
from (4) and (7),
β∗k ≥ G −
G + P
2
=
G − P
2
> 0, 1 ≤ k ≤ m
Thus, from (5),
λ∗1 +
m
∑
k=1
β∗k ≥ m
(
G − P
2
)
>
G + P
2
for large m
This contradicts (6). The result follows.
The nucleolus is w = (P + G/2, G/2) in this case. We
show that w 6∈ O for sufficiently large m. Suppose w ∈
O. Then, again, λ∗1+
∑m
k=1 β
∗
k = G/2+P and λ
∗
2 = G/2
for some optimal solution (λ∗, β∗) of D({1, 2}). Thus,
from (4), β∗k ≥ G−G/2 = G/2 > 0, 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Thus,
from (5), λ∗1+
∑m
k=1 β
∗
k ≥ mG/2 > (G/2+P ) for large
enough m. This contradicts the fact that λ∗1+
∑m
k=1 β
∗
k =
G/2 + P . The result follows.
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This suggests that, it is in general unlikely that C can be
characterized by polynomial number of inequalities for
the class of games we consider.
IV. GENERALIZATION OF THE COALITIONAL GAME
MODEL IN PRESENCE OF PRIOR PREFERENCES
We have shown that if an operator decides which coali-
tion to join based only on the revenue it can earn thereby,
it will be possible to induce each operator to join the
grand coalition (Section III-A). But, the operators may
make such decisions based on additional considerations
such as prior trust relations. We now generalize the
coalitional game model and our analytical results to this
case.
Now, each operator decides apriori which other operators
it can cooperate with, and decides which ones among
these it would actually cooperate with, based on the
revenue considerations. We also assume that (a) if i can
cooperate with j, j can also cooperate with i, and (b) i
can cooperate with j if there exists operators k1, . . . , kp,
such that i can cooperate with k1, kl can cooperate with
kl+1 for l = 1, . . . , p − 1, and kp can cooperate with
j. The motivation behind (a) is that trust relations are
oftentimes mutual. The motivation behind (b) is that en-
tities trust each other if they trust a common entity. This
scenario can be modeled by representing the operators
as vertices of an undirected graph, and allowing an edge
to exist between a pair of vertices if and only if the
operators can cooperate. The resulting graph consists
of components that are cliques. Let the number of
components be K , and the components be N1, . . . ,NK .
Now, v(S) is defined as before if S is a subset of such
a component. Otherwise, v(S) =
∑K
k=1 v(S ∩ Nk).
Thus v(S) is obtained by concatenating the solutions
of P(S ∩ Nk). Thus, if operators l, r are in different
components of the above graph, αjk = 0 if j ∈ Bl,
k ∈ Mr, even when l, r are in a coalition. Thus, such
operators never use each others’ resources, and never
cooperate physically. So, each coalition S effectively
consists of disjoint coalitions S ∩N1, . . . ,S ∩NK , and
when an operator in the component k joins a coalition
S, it effectively joins a coalition of operators that are in
S ∩ Nk.
Let C′ be the core of this game. Let Ok be defined for
D(Nk), as O was defined for D(N ). Let
O′ = O1 × . . . ×OK
Theorem 4.1: Let P(Nk) be feasible for k = 1, . . . , K .
Then, O′ 6= φ and O′ ⊆ C′.
The proof is similar to that for Theorem 3.1, and is
omitted for brevity. Thus, an imputation in the core can
be obtained by solving K concave optimizations, each
with O(B + M) variables and O(BM) constraints.
Next, as in Section III-B, since C′ 6= φ, the nucleolus
belongs to C′, and hence stabilizes the grand coalition.
Lemma 3.1 holds in this case well - the Shapley value
does not in general ensure that the grand coalition is
stable.
Finally, a desirable imputation in C′ can be computed
solving an optimization problem, as described in Sec-
tion III-D. Towards this end, using v(.) functions as
described in this section, C′ can be characterized using
2n linear equalities, as C was characterized by (1). But,
the time required to compute such imputations depends
on the number of inequalities required to characterize
C′. We next show that such a characterization can be
accomplished using
∑K
k=1 2
|Nk| linear equalities.
A coalition S is said to be essential if for any proper
partition P of S, v(S) >
∑
T ∈P v(T ). Let E be the
set of essential coalitions. It is well known that the
core can be completely characterized using only the
essential coalitions [21]. This follows because for any
imputation x,
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S) for each coalition S
if and only if this holds for all essential coalitions.
Also, since v(N ) =
∑K
k=1 v(Nk) in this case, when
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S) for each coalition S,
∑
i∈N xi = v(N )
if and only if
∑
i∈Nk
xi = v(Nk) for each k = 1, . . . , K .
Thus,
C′ = {x ∈ Rn : ∑
i∈Nk
xi = v(Nk), 1 ≤ k ≤ K,
∑
i∈T
xi ≥ v(T ), ∀ T ∈ E} (8)
We show that the number of essential coalitions is at
most
∑K
k=1 2
|Nk| in this case. Let a coalition S consist
of operators in multiple components Nks. Then, consider
the partition P consisting of S ∩ Nk for k = 1, . . .K.
Clearly, P is a proper partition of S. Also, v(S) =
∑
T ∈P v(T ). Thus, S is not an essential coalition. Thus,
only the subsets of the components can be in E , and
there are only
∑K
k=1 2
|Nk| such subsets. Now, the result
follows from (8).
Note that
∑K
k=1 2
|Nk| ≤ 2n, and the difference be-
tween the two may be substantial. For example, when
maxk |Nk| (i.e., the maximum number of operators who
are willing to cooperate with each other) is O(logn),
then
∑K
k=1 2
|Nk| is a polynomial in n.
V. CONCLUSION
We have considered the scenario in which several oper-
ators in a geographical area offer downlink wireless data
access to subscribers. Operators can cooperate, thereby
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pooling their network resources, and agreeing to serve
each other’s subscribers. We have taken the aggregate
revenue earned by a coalition to be the maximum sum
utility over the cooperating operators, subject to the
various physical rate constraints between the subscribers
and the various operators. Such a formulation leads to a
coalitional game. The characteristic function is obtained
as the value of an optimization problem with a concave
objective function and linear constraints. In Theorem 3.1
we have shown that this coalitional game has a nonempty
core. In particular, the dual of a nonlinear program
provides a subset, O, of the core. We have also in-
vestigated the nucleolus and the Shapely value of such
coalition games. The nucleolus and certain interesting
imputations, defined in terms of optimization problems,
need not be in the set O (see Lemma 3.2). Whenever
the core is non-empty, the nucleolus is in the core, but
in general, the Shapely value will not be in the core (see
Lemma 3.1). We found, however, that a coalition that in-
creases total revenue can induce unfairness for the users
of some of the operators and may therefore reduce the
customer base of these operators. Due to the possibility
of unfairness, it was interesting to consider minimum
rate agreements (or service level agreements, SLAs)
between operators and subscribers. Our investigations
reveal that the operators need to judiciously determine
which SLAs to accept. We have also investigated criteria
for selecting a particular member of the core, when
the core is nonempty. Finally, we have shown that the
grand coalition is stabilizable even when the operators
cooperate not merely looking at the revenues, but also
taking into account additional considerations such as
prior trust relations (Theorem 4.1).
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